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in Illinois and had communicated there with plaintiff's employees.
The court held that "either the making of the alleged contract
itself, or the activity in furtherance of it, while defendant was
physically present... is the business shown to have been transacted
by defendant within Illinois. .... ,, 47 Since section 302 was modeled
on Section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, the case has direct
bearing on the former.
In an action for breach of warranty, a foreign corporation was
4
held subject to in personam jurisdiction under section 302(a) (1). 8
The defendant had contracted to sell two machines to plaintiff.
The initial agreement stipulated that the contract was made in
New York and that New York law governed the transaction. The
defendant was not doing business in New York and the machines
were delivered f.o.b. Chicago. The court, in sustaining jurisdiction,
found it unnecessary to rely on the recital that the contract was
made in New York because the pleaded cause of action (breach of
warranty) arose out of the transaction of business in New York.
Aside from extensive negotiations in New York, the participation
of defendant in the installation and testing of the machines required
officials and employees of defendant to be present here. The court
held that the constitutional requirements of due process were
satisfied "because defendant's contacts with New York were so
many and so directly physical." 49
It is important to note that in both Iroquois and Longines
the court laid great stress on the fact that the activities within
the state involved the physical presence of defendant or his agents.
Absent these physical activities, the courts might not have upheld
jurisdiction; in Hanson v. Denckla,5 0 it was stated that there must
be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." "' But if
the contract was made in New York, that fact in itself might be
sufficient. In the cited cases, the courts had more to rely on and
did not have to reach that question.
In personam jurisdiction in attorney's suit for fees.
The fact of defendant's officer's physical presence in New York

52
was deemed significant in Lewis v. American Archives Assn.

A written contract of employment had been executed in New
at -, 186 N.E.2d at 79.
4SLongines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 App.
Div. 2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1964).
49M. at 478, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
47Id.

50357
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U.S. 235 (1958).

Id.at 253.
5243 Misc. 2d 721, 252 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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York by plaintiff, a New York attorney, and defendant, through its
vice-president. Plaintiff had conducted examinations within the
state as required by the contract, and on at least one occasion
defendant's vice-president entered New York for purposes having
a direct relation to plaintiff's employment. The court, holding
that there was sufficient contact by defendant with this jurisdiction,
stated: "it was the intention of the legislature to make nondomiciliary defendants more accessible to the jurisdiction of our
courts, thus affording greater protection to the residents of this
state." 53
A case analogous to Lewis is Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas
Co.,54 where it was held in a suit for attorney's fees that defendant
had not transacted business under Section 17 of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act. In that case, plaintiffs, a lawyer and an engineer,
were hired by one Woods to assist him in the incorporation of
his business. Although plaintiffs performed most of their services
in Illinois, there was no evidence that any officer or employee
of defendant had ever been physically present in Illinois. The
court held that "the performance of the professional services by
plaintiffs in Illinois . . . standing alone are insufficient to bring
defendant within any reasonable construction of the act [Illinois
Civil Practice Act Section 17] in question." 15 While the New
York Lewis case and the Illinois Orton case are factually distinguishable, New York might well have sustained jurisdiction on
Orton's facts. Due process and CPLR 302 would appear to
allow it. When X hires Y to perform services in New York, it
is not unjust to make X answer in a New York court for the
value of those services.
In Orton there was apparently no contract of employment
made in Illinois between plaintiffs and defendant; nor had there
ever been any physical activity in Illinois by defendant through
its officers or employees. But the very services rendered by the
plaintiffs in Illinois, at the instance of defendant, were in furtherance of, and therefore reasonably characterized as a transaction of,
the defendant's business. The agents through whom defendant
transacted the business were the plaintiffs themselves; but CPLR
302 has no objection to that. In fact, the purpose of section
302 would appear to be frustrated if someone performing services
in New York for and at the request of X were compelled to
seek compensation for these services elsewhere.
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Id. at 722, 252 N.Y.S.d at 219.
249 F2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957).

55 Id. at 202.

